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Abstract
This article tests the extent to which the organization and stringency of occupational
health and safety regulation complements the dominant mode of coordination in
the political economy. While the UK explicitly sanctions risk-cost-benefit trade-offs,
other European countries mandate ambitious safety goals. That contrast appears to
reflect cleavages identified in the Varieties of Capitalism literature, which suggests
worker protection regimes are stronger in coordinated market economies than in
liberal market economies. Our analysis of Germany, France, UK and the
Netherlands, shows that the varied organization of their regulatory regimes is ex-
plained through a three-way complementarity with their welfare systems and
modes of coordination. However, despite varied headline goals, we find no system-
atic differences in the stringency of those countries’ regulatory protections insofar
as they all make trade-offs on safety. Instead, the explicitness, rationalizations and
logics of trade-offs vary according to each country’s legal system, state tradition and
coupling between regulation and welfare system.
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1. Introduction
In 2007, the UK won a protracted battle with the European Commission (EC) over its expli-
cit framing of occupational health and safety (OHS) regulation as a trade-off between safety
and cost (C-127/05, Commission v. UK [2007] ECR I-4619). The EC had referred the UK
to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), alleging that UK law compromised the goal of
European OHS regulation by stipulating that workers should only be protected against
harm ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’. The EC—and, indeed, European trade unions—
argued that this qualification was inconsistent with the Framework Directive’s (89/391/
EEC) absolute duty on employers to ‘ensure the safety and health of workers in every aspect
related to the work’. Other European Union (EU) Member States had transposed the
Directive without qualifying its goal, and so should the UK. The UK successfully countered,
however, that since it is ‘impossible to eliminate all [workplace] risks’ (HSE, 1989, p.17), it
is better to ensure that the cost, time and effort required to reduce risk is not grossly dispro-
portionate to the benefit gained.
At first sight, this conflict over regulatory trade-offs between cost and safety is consistent
with an important theme of the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature, some of which sug-
gests that liberal market economies (LMEs)—typified by the UK—offer weaker welfare and
labour market protections to workers than the coordinated market economies (CMEs) of
continental Europe. VoC scholars often explain contrasts in welfare protection policies as
arising from differences in economic competitiveness strategies, which welfare systems recip-
rocally complement and enhance. They argue that because CMEs invest more in developing
firm- and industry-specific skills than LMEs, there are therefore greater incentives for firms
and workers in CMEs to protect those investments on which their competitiveness depends,
than in LMEs where competitiveness depends on labour market flexibility rather than on
sustaining long-term employer–employee relationships (e.g. Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Hall
and Gingerich, 2009; Hay and Wincott, 2012).
Most discussion of worker protection in the VoC literature has focussed on how welfare
and labour market protections vary with and institutionally complement the distinctive
organizational logics underpinning different political economies. It would not seem unrea-
sonable, however, to expect the organization and stringency of OHS regulation to follow
similar patterns, since keeping workers safe and healthy is an important part of the cost-
structure for businesses. For example, at the time of writing, there is a furious debate about
whether the UK’s exit from the regulatory constraints of the EU will herald the erosion of a
host of worker protections to enhance the nation’s competitiveness. From that perspective,
the stark difference between the Directive’s goal of ensuring safety and the UK’s risk-based
goal of qualified—‘so far as is reasonably practicable’—protection is consistent with the ac-
cusations of critics of Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, who decry the turn to risk-based regula-
tory rationales as assaults on public and worker protection (Dodds, 2006).
At the same time, such claims highlight a puzzle. Improving workplace safety inevitably
carries costs, and so trade-offs about how much additional safety and at what price are inev-
itable, since it is impossible to ‘ensure’ complete safety as the Directive demands—whether
from collapsing mine shafts or repetitive strain injuries from typing—without terminating
the activity entirely. So how is it possible for EU Member States to implement the Directive
without simply ignoring its mandate to keep workers safe? That puzzle is even harder to
understand given that Eurostat data has long suggested that, far from having their safety
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compromised by risk-based regulation, UK workers have long enjoyed some of the lowest
rates of occupational injury in the EU. Indeed, rates of fatal injury in the UK—the most reli-
able of such statistics—have been consistently lower than in Germany and France where the
legal requirement for safety is unqualified (see Figure 1).
Given that puzzle, this article examines the extent to which the organization and strin-
gency of OHS regulation vary according to the dominant mode of coordination in the pol-
itical economy, using the cases of the UK, Netherlands, Germany and France. In the next
section, we discuss why the conflict over the adoption of risk-based OHS regulation pro-
vides a critical case for testing whether VoC can help explain regulatory variety across cap-
italist welfare states. After justifying our methodological approach in Section 3, Section 4
outlines our findings that while the organization of OHS regulation in each country
broadly varies in ways that support different VoC, there is no evidence for any systematic
differences in the stringency of OHS regulation. All our case-study countries accommodate
cost-benefit trade-offs, albeit in strikingly different ways. In Section 5, we discuss how and
why the organization, but not the stringency, of OHS regulation forms an institutional
complementarity to each country’s mode of coordination; attributing the different ways in
which trade-offs are made across our countries to differences in legal systems, state trad-
itions and coupling between regulation and welfare regimes. We draw more general con-
clusions in Section 6.
2. Risk-based Regulation and VoC
The UK’s success at the ECJ reaffirmed its commitment to what has become known as ‘risk-
based’ regulation. First applied to OHS regulation in the 1970s, the UK has over the last dec-
ade or so championed risk-based regulation as a universal approach to ‘better regulation’
across policy domains, from the environment and food to healthcare and higher education
(Rothstein et al., 2006, 2013). The central conceit of risk-based regulation is that trying to
Figure 1. Fatal accidents at work per 100 000 workers in the 28 Member States of the EU, 2008–2014.
Source: Eurostat (2016).
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prevent all adverse regulatory outcomes is disproportionately costly and can distract
attention from more serious problems (Breyer, 1993; Graham, 2010). Instead, its propon-
ents argue that it is more socially optimal to calibrate regulatory efforts in proportion to
risk, as judged by both the probability and the consequence of harm occurring (Baldwin and
Black, 2010). For example, closing entire railway lines during maintenance would eliminate
the risks of collision with workers, but would be less practicable than using warning signals
and posting lookouts and would not prevent other risks such as working with heavy
machinery.
Promoted by a variety of national and supranational organizations, such as the US Office
of Management and Budget, the World Trade Organization and the OECD (2010), risk-
based regulation is now commonplace, particularly across Anglo-Saxon economies. The EU
is also embracing risk-based approaches in domains as diverse as food safety, finance, and
data protection. Critics of Anglo-Saxon neo-liberalism, however, have argued that risk-
based regulation weakens regulatory protections by individualizing the downside risks of or-
ganizational failure onto victims rather than risk creators (e.g. Gray, 2009). Several OHS
commentators have likewise argued that risk rhetoric serves as a cover for deregulation and
diminishing protection for workers (Tombs and Whyte, 2013). In that context, the striking
difference in the transposition of the OHS Framework Directive suggests that continental
Member States are less prepared to qualify regulatory protections for worker safety than
the UK.
This article examines the extent to which a VoC perspective can help explain this fault
line over OHS regulation. In so doing, we seek to build upon the nascent debate about
varieties of regulatory capitalism (e.g. Levi-Faur, 2006; Thatcher, 2007; Braithwaite,
2008; Guardiancich and Guidi, 2016), which has expanded VoC’s central concern with
archetypal differences between the ‘production’ regimes of capitalist economies to consider
their ‘regulatory’ regimes and the extent to which VoC can explain differences in the
organization and function of the state. We will argue that there are good reasons to expect
the character of OHS regulation to vary according to the dominant modes of economic co-
ordination in different countries, but to make that argument we first outline the basic con-
tours of VoC.
VoC’s core claim is that capitalist economies are distinctively organized according to the
extent to which firms use strategic or market-based methods to coordinate their activities
with each other and with other actors, such as trade unions and sources of finance. Those
modes of coordination are said to confer comparative advantages by promoting distinct
competitiveness strategies. Thus, according to Hall and Soskice (2001), the coordinated
market economies (CMEs) of continental Europe are typically characterized by dense net-
works of long term and trusting relationships between firms and other actors such as trade
unions and financial institutions. This mode of strategic coordination favours incremental
innovation strategies. By contrast, LMEs find comparative advantage through radical innov-
ation strategies that are favoured by competitive market-based relationships between firms
and other actors such as employees.
The effectiveness and stability of those strategies, however, depends on their reinforce-
ment by mutually beneficial interactions with institutions in other spheres of the political
economy. These so-called ‘institutional complementarities’ include the way in which differ-
ent modes of coordination favour, and are favoured by, distinct kinds of industrial relations,
employment protection and vocational training regimes (e.g. Hall and Gingerich, 2009;
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Hay and Wincott, 2012; Schneider and Paunescu, 2012; Schröder, 2013). Thus, Hall and
Soskice (2001) argue that the CME mode of coordination is enhanced through institutional
complementarities such as strong industrial relations, heavy investments in specialized firm-
specific training, and consensual decision-making. By contrast, the LME mode of coord-
ination is said to be institutionally complemented by, inter alia, weak industrial relations,
reliance on portable general skills, and hierarchical decision-making.
Moving beyond the original VoC framework, some scholars have identified a hybrid
VoC in the mixed-market economies (MME) of the Mediterranean such as France, Spain
and Italy. In MMEs, the state plays a central role in coordinating business and labour, which
are more weakly organized than in Germany’s ‘managed capitalism’ but have the power to
veto state action or exercise constitutionally founded rights for compensation. Such institu-
tional arrangements tend to be regarded as less complementary and consequently less com-
petitive than LMEs and CMEs (e.g. Molina and Rhodes, 2007; Schmidt, 2003; Van Dam,
2014; cf. Guardiancich and Guidi, 2016).
VoC theory is not without its critics. Tests of the theory are sometimes controversial, not
least because VoC categories are often hard to apply to the messy reality of existing political
economies and sometimes because VoC concepts are unfairly stretched to apply to contexts
that are beyond their explanatory power (e.g. Amable, 2003; Deeg and Jackson, 2007; Hall
and Thelen, 2009; Hancké et al., 2007; Schmidt, 2003; Witt and Jackson, 2016) . Another
problem with VoC theory is that its central concept of institutional complementarity is am-
biguous and contested (cf. Crouch et al., 2005). In its simplest formulation, institutional
complementarity is used to capture synergistic effects between institutions; or as Hall puts it,
‘that one (or more) institution(s) may enhance the effects of another institution (or of several
others)’ (Crouch et al., 2005, p.373). However that definition is easily confused, both con-
ceptually and empirically, with a number of other closely related but subtly differing con-
cepts for describing relationships between institutions. For example, Boyer (2005) argues
that two or more institutions may be observed to coexist, but without evidence of, or reason
to expect, mutual enhancement, they might be best described as merely ‘compatible’ rather
than ‘complementary’. Höpner (2005), among others, also identifies a further state of insti-
tutional ‘coherence’ which arises from institutions sharing common origins or principles
without necessarily being mutually enhancing and complementary. While such isomorphism
is often associated with complementarity, Amable insists they ‘are totally independent no-
tions that may or may not coincide’ (Crouch et al., 2005, p. 372).
These conceptual difficulties are amplified by methodological challenges in empirically
demonstrating complementarity. Mutual enhancement can be difficult to define and meas-
ure, while detailed historical analysis is required to show the dynamic co-evolution that is
another hallmark of complementarity. Without such evidence, the literature on VoC has
sometimes relied on abductive arguments that infer complementarity amongst institutions
based simply on observed isomorphism and appeals to functional necessity. But functionalist
approaches are liable to conflate institutional complementarity with mere compatibility or
isomorphic coherence without some convincing ex ante prediction from theory as to why
any observed co-variation might be driven by a dynamic of complementarity rather than
other institutional mechanisms.
VoC scholarship has also historically tended to neglect regulation, reflecting what some
see as the theory’s general disinterest in the state (cf. Hancké et al, 2009; Schmidt, 2009;
Whitley, 2005). There is, however, some tentative evidence that a VoC approach might help
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explain often noted variation both in the organization and stringency of national regulatory
strategies in a range of domains (e.g.Vogel, 1996). Thatcher (2007), for example, has argued
that despite several decades of neo-liberal reforms to network industries across the EU, dis-
tinctive national differences in the organization of informal regulatory institutions have per-
sisted in ways that complement continuing contrasts in VoC. Building on that insight, others
have tested the extent to which the independence of financial, market and utility regulators
correspond to different capitalist coordination models, although so far they have had mixed
findings (Maggetti, 2007; Guidi, 2014; Guardiancich and Guidi, 2016). Other research has
shown that VoC can help explain substantial differences in the stringency of regulation.
Menz (2009) and Ruhs (2013), for example, have shown that labour migration regulation
co-varies with different economies’ skills formation strategies, while Pierre’s (2015) analysis
of market deregulation observed that CMEs tend to impose both more and stricter rules on
market actors than LMEs.
VoC scholars have yet to examine ex ante regulation to prevent occupational harms.
There is, however, a wealth of VoC scholarship showing how the organization and strin-
gency of other worker social protection regimes, such as employment security, wage bar-
gaining rights and ex post social insurance arrangements for injured and sick workers,
depend on the different configurations of employer and employee interests in CMEs and
LMEs (e.g. Hall and Gingerich, 2009; Jackson and Kirsch, 2014). For example, Mares
(2001), Estevez-Abe et al. (2001), and Hay and Wincott (2012) contend that CMEs support
strong labour market protection and generous welfare regimes to protect significant invest-
ments by employers and employees in developing the firm- and industry-specific skills char-
acteristic of those economies. By contrast, they argue that LMEs support weaker protections
because the focus on portable generalist skills means that workers and employers are less
committed to sustaining long-term employment relationships, and wages and employment
conditions are set competitively through the market.
Extending such arguments to OHS regulation would provide a critical case for testing
whether and how state regulation institutionally complements nationally distinctive VoCs.
After all, health and safety regulation has long been a significant part of the fabric of legal
obligations woven through employer–employee relationships in advanced economies.
Indeed, protecting workers from accidents and ill-health was a driving concern in the cre-
ation of welfare states in the C19th. From that perspective, we might expect that the organ-
ization and stringency of ex ante risk prevention measures, no less than ex post social
insurance systems, should vary depending upon the dominant modes of economic coordin-
ation in different capitalist welfare states. We develop three sets of broad predictions; one
per ideal-typical variant:
 In CMEs, OHS regulation might be expected to be organized through dense sectoral net-
works of employers and employees in strong corporatist institutions underpinned by legal
frameworks that sustain a relatively equal balance of power between the social partners,
potentially also with strong sectoral orientations. In terms of stringency, we might expect
that employers’ and employees’ interests would converge on strong ex ante safety meas-
ures to prevent accidents and ill-health both because employers have an interest in pro-
tecting their investments in skilled labour and because employees—beyond simple self-
preservation—face problems in finding safer workplace alternatives because of relatively
inflexible labour-markets.
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 In LMEs, by contrast, OHS regulation might be expected to be more arms-length than in
CMEs, taking the form of regulatory agencies and permissive legal frameworks oriented
towards correcting market failures that, for example, prevent workers making informed
choices or finding alternative safer employment. VoC theory might also predict weaker
OHS regulation in LMEs because employers have less interest in retaining workers than
in CMEs, while workers have greater flexibility—at least in classic liberal accounts (e.g.
Viscusi, 1983)—either to negotiate higher wages to reflect the risks they face or seek safer
employment elsewhere.
 In MMEs, we might expect to find some traits of CME organization with the state playing
a central role in coordinating business and labour. That also means that the stringency of
OHS regulation seems less predictable than in the other two cases because it will be sub-
ject to a constant tug-of-war between powerful state intervention and institutionalized
political and constitutional checks by business and labour.
3. Methods
To examine the extent to which VoC can explain the organization and stringency of OHS
protections across Europe, we compared regulatory regimes in four European countries
characterized by their proximity to different ideal-types of capitalist variety. Germany and
the UK were selected as paradigmatic cases of a CME and LME, respectively. France was se-
lected as a more complex MME, described by Schmidt (2003) as ‘state-led capitalism’, ex-
hibiting both CME and LME characteristics. The Netherlands was selected for its different
mix of CME and LME characteristics, oscillating over the C20th between what Nijhof and
van den Berg (2015) have described as state-directed neo-corporatism and softer forms of
decentralized coordination. All those countries are advanced EU economies, so that any dif-
ferences in regulatory design would be hard to attribute to economic structure or state
capacities (OHS enforcement capacities are similar for all four countries [Hartlapp, 2014]).
OHS is also a cross-sectoral issue that is relevant to every workplace, so national compari-
sons are unlikely to be confounded by sectoral-specific arrangements that might outweigh
national differences. Moreover, that cross-sectoral nature makes any differences in regula-
tory stringency hard to explain in terms of trade-protectionism.
We recognize that a larger sample of countries might better represent the increasingly
recognized heterogeneity among countries within the same broad VoC categories (e.g.
Jackson and Kirsch, 2014; Witt and Jackson, 2016). However, our purposeful sample delib-
erately sacrifices breadth for the depth required to assess the co-evolution and institutional
complementarity of OHS regulation with other coexisting institutional formations in each
country. Thus to document the organization and stringency of regulatory activities we took
a ‘regime approach’ (Hood et al., 2001), which involved going beyond examination of
black-letter law to understand the organization, practices and animating ideas of regulatory
rule-setting and compliance activities. To that end we triangulated an in-depth literature re-
view and policy document analysis with an extensive programme of interviews (n>40) in
each country with key regulatory officials, insurance and professional associations, business
and labour groups, some of whom also provided feedback on earlier drafts. Interviews were
transcribed and coded with QDA software for a qualitative analysis guided by VoC expect-
ations but were also used for inductive identification of other institutional drivers of regula-
tory variety.
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4. Organization and Stringency of OHS regulation in Germany, France,
the UK and Netherlands
The 1989 OHS Framework Directive (89/391/EEC) was the EU’s first comprehensive at-
tempt to harmonize a diverse set of national OHS regulatory regimes that all emerged in the
latter half of the 19th century. During the early industrial revolution, employers were free to
do as they wished subject only to worker complaint and the weak threat of tort when acci-
dents occurred. Pressure for reform mounted during the 19th century, however, as em-
ployers increasingly lost tort cases, workers demanded better conditions, and even the
German army worried about its recruits’ health. Consequently, all four countries created,
within a decade or so of each other, distinct regimes for both regulating workplace safety as
well as covering the costs of work-related injuries and illness. In the two sections below we
examine the extent to which the organization and then the stringency of OHS regulatory re-
gimes in our four countries are consistent with our predictions from VoC theory.
4.1 Organization of OHS Regulation
In this first section we describe the organization of the regulatory institutions, processes and
actors involved in OHS regulation in order to test the extent to which it complements the
dominant modes of firm coordination in our four countries as predicted by VoC theory.
Germany
In Germany’s CME, the social partners are heavily involved in standard-setting, enforce-
ment and compliance in what is known as a ‘dual system’, which brings together largely ena-
bling statutory regulation with a largely sectorally organized corporatist social insurance
system that sets detailed compliance criteria and ensures close coordination with the needs
of the wider political economy. The origins of this German approach dates back to the 1891
Industrial Code, whose broad obligations have been elaborated in a number of further stat-
utes, ordinances and increasingly through the transposition of EU Directives. Some of those
rules are issued by Federal government-led corporatist committees, which operate, according
to an employer representative on the Committee for Hazardous Substances, on the basis of
reaching a ‘socio-political consensus’. The State, however, has overwhelmingly delegated the
task of specifying detailed legal compliance criteria to the social insurance system since the
late C19th.
Established by the 1884 Industrial Insurance Act, the German social insurance system
abolished the civil liability of employers in favour of a no-fault liability scheme of tabulated
compensation for all income and medical costs of work-related injuries, illness and death.
The system is administered by the Berufsgenossenschaften (BGs); a set of powerful regional
and sectoral mutual trade associations that typify the German model of coordinating, rather
than directing, the economy, being funded through compulsory contributions from em-
ployers but governed jointly by employers and employees. The BGs have legal duties under
the Social Code to prevent, compensate and rehabilitate, and it is their corporatist technical
committees that flesh out the vast majority of legal compliance criteria through formidable
tomes of detailed and often legally binding accident prevention rules, standards and
guidance.
The BGs’ active role in preventing workplace accidents dates back to Bismarck’s vocifer-
ous opposition to state regulation as an illegitimate interference in private production; not
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least, as Hennock (2007) has entertainingly noted, because of his dim view of a factory
inspection of his own sawmill. In fact, this corporatist self-regulatory system built on the
long-standing freedom of the German guilds—the Gewerbefreiheit—to organize economic
production. Delegation of OHS rule-making to the BGs institutionally complemented those
traditions by helping ensure the coordination of rules with sectoral needs, while simultan-
eously helping BGs manage demands on their insurance funds. Indeed, as Mares (2001,
p. 205) has noted, the BGs demanded rule-making powers to ensure their financial sustain-
ability as a quid pro quo for employer acceptance of compulsory strict liability insurance.
These days, BG decisions on insurance premiums, such as bonus/malus schemes calibrated
to firm safety performance, are negotiated by tripartite corporatist committees (Ayaß,
2012).
The close involvement of employers and employees in rule-making is mirrored by other
highly coordinated compliance, enforcement and rehabilitation activities. For example, since
the 1970s, worker representatives have had significant rights to participate in works safety
councils shaping how firms implement OHS rules; rights which have been jealously guarded
even through court cases (Schaapman, 2002). While state enforcement of the regime is the
formal responsibility of the Länder Labour Inspectorates, which date back to 1853, these in-
spectorates largely draw on the BG accident prevention rules, technical standards and guid-
ance. Moreover, state enforcement is also complemented by the BGs’ own technical
inspectorates who principally offer sector-specific compliance advice, albeit backed up by
some enforcement powers, and undertake approximately twice the number of inspections as
their Länder counterparts (DGUV, 2014; LWSI, 2011–2013). Finally, BGs also provide a
wealth of other services that complement sectoral compliance needs including hospitals, re-
search institutes and an industrial safety training scheme that is the second-largest provider
of education in Germany after state schools (HSE, 1996, Ch.3, p. 118).
France
Like Germany, France also takes a ‘dual system’ approach to OHS that combines both regu-
lation and social insurance, but, as might be expected of an MME, they are more poorly
coordinated, with the state having a stronger role in regulation than the social partners, and
the largely sectorally organized corporatist social insurance system creating its own rules
that operate in parallel to statutory regulation. The origins of this regulatory approach date
back to the 1893 Industrial Establishments Act, whose obligations were further elaborated
over the C20th through EU Directives and an ever accumulating mass of detailed regulations
in the statutory Labour Code issued by the Ministry of Labour. The rules of the
Labour Code are coordinated through a corporatist body known as the COCT (Conseil
d’Orientation sur les Conditions de Travail), but strategic decisions are reserved for state of-
ficials with social partners confined to an advisory role. The central and constraining role of
the state is seen as a source of friction by the social partners. As a senior Labour ministry
civil servant explained to us, ‘[The COCT] wants . . . social, economic and state actors to de-
sign policy together but it’s not the French culture; the Ministry of Labour resists this.’
The state also plays a role in leading employer–employee coordination over implementa-
tion. Worker participation in firm-level safety committees was legally strengthened in the
1980s, but research suggests that they remain relatively weak (Rivest, 2002). The Ministry
of Labour’s regionally based Labour Inspectorate, the DIRECCTE, has advisory functions
that could strengthen those processes; indeed, inspectors are legally invited to firms’ works
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councils meetings. In practice, however, inspectors are trained as lawyers and see their pri-
mary role as enforcing the law. As one DIRECCTE representative explained, ‘Even if we
don’t often use criminal prosecution, we are seen more as gendarmes than as advisors.’
Moreover, the Ministry of Labour struggles to coordinate the activities of its inspectorate
with its own strategic priorities because inspectors benefit from unusual levels of individual
autonomy. As the DIRECCTE representative continued, ‘The Ministry wants to set prior-
ities but we resist this; we know our companies and set our own priorities . . . It’s a very spe-
cial position unlike other inspectorates.’ In fact, such problems have been observed in other
field services, suggesting more systemic coordination problems within France’s MME (Cole,
2008, p. 31).
As in Germany, the French social insurance system also has a significant regulatory func-
tion but facilitates more strategic coordination between firms and employees than the
Labour Code. The social insurance system was created by the 1898 Workmen’s
Compensation Act, which, as in Germany, replaced the civil liability of employers in favour
of a no-fault worker compensation scheme to cover the lost income and medical costs of
work-related injuries, illnesses and fatalities. The regime, which was absorbed into the social
security system in 1946, is administered by the Caisses; a set of powerful national, regional
and sectoral mutual associations funded by mandatory employer contributions and gov-
erned by the social partners. Like the German BGs, corporatist technical committees of the
Caisses issue their own accident-prevention rules. While these rules are principally advisory
in nature, they compensate for otherwise relatively weak strategic coordination between the
State, firms and employees over OHS, while also helping manage financial demands on in-
surance funds. The Caisses’ role in preventing accidents in the workplace is strengthened by
their own dedicated corps of engineers and technicians who, in contrast to the DIRECCTE,
are ‘80% advisors and 20% gendarmes’ as a DIRECCTE representative explained. As in
Germany, decisions on insurance premiums—including bonus/malus variations according to
firm safety performance—are negotiated by corporatist committees, and the Caisses even fi-
nance workplace improvements to reduce compensation costs (HSE, 1996, p. 65).
UK
In contrast to the dual systems of Germany and France, workplace accident prevention in
the UK’s LME relies principally on statutory regulation, which is overseen by residual cor-
poratist arrangements to coordinate regulation with the needs of the wider political econ-
omy but institutionally decoupled from largely tax-payer funded compensation and medical
treatment regimes. The regulatory regime was founded on the Factory Acts, which extend
back to 1833. Their broad objectives to safeguard life and limb and promote public health
were fleshed out through a notoriously complex and gap-laden patchwork of highly pre-
scriptive regulatory rules. However, in unusual contrast to the broad UK tradition of infor-
mal consultation over legislation, the rules were subject to statutory consultation, not least
to help address inevitable information asymmetries (Factories Act, 1937, Schedule 2).
The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 (HSWA) fundamentally transformed that
regulatory regime, replacing inflexible rules with the universal principle that employers must
ensure, ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ (SFAIRP), the safety, health and welfare of em-
ployees (Baldwin, 1992; Demeritt et al., 2015). That principles-based approach was in-
tended to promote safety through ‘personal responsibility and voluntary self-generated
effort’ as Lord Robens—the regime’s architect—expressed it (Robens, 1972, para. 28). The
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new approach has been described as ‘enforced self-regulation’ (Braithwaite, 1982), which
seeks to capitalize on the internal compliance expertise and capacities of regulatees by
requiring employers themselves to justify how their decisions meet regulatory requirements
under criminal law.
The new approach was also strongly shaped by contemporary British experiments with
corporatism. An unusually powerful independent regulator, the Health and Safety
Commission (HSC), was created as a tripartite corporatist body to make policy and oversee
a new independent expert inspectorate—the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Employers
were also legally obliged to consult union, and later non-union, safety representatives where
they had been appointed. Those corporatist arrangements, as Fairman (2007) has persua-
sively argued, were necessary to build political legitimacy for the regime’s explicit cost-
benefit philosophy, as evidenced by the explicit continuing support of both unions and em-
ployers in a recent government review (Lofstedt, 2011). Over time, however, those arrange-
ments have become weaker; worker consultation has diminished with declining union
membership (Walters, 2002, Ch.9), and, in 2008, the HSE absorbed the HSC and became
nominally subject to direction by the Secretary of State.
Inspection responsibilities are divided between expert inspectors from the HSE and local
government, who combine the advisory and enforcement functions that are more separated
out in Germany and France between their state and social insurance inspectors. As one for-
mer inspector explained, ‘if there’s been a bad accident you put your policeman’s hat on . . .;
but normally you’re an adviser or teacher, trying to feel how well the company is managing
health and safety’.
Unlike Germany and France, arrangements to cover the costs of work-related accidents
and sickness play no significant role in preventative OHS regulation. To supplement a weak
tort regime, the 1897 Workers’ Compensation Act established a limited no-fault liability re-
gime, which was funded through employers’ private insurance without regard to the riski-
ness of individual workplaces (Lewis, 2012). After World War II, the Beveridge reforms
socialized injury and illness costs through taxpayer-funded social security benefits, a state in-
dustrial injuries compensation scheme, and the National Health Service (NHS), which have
little incentive or capacity to have their own regulatory functions. Employee rights to sue for
damages were retained to complement the residual nature of the welfare regime, but only
where harm is ‘reasonably foreseeable’, and since 1990, the state has deducted medical costs
and social security benefits from successful awards. Insurance payouts now exceed the in-
dustrial injuries scheme, but premiums account for only 0.25% of national payroll and only
half of employers employ enough workers to be rated according to accident record (Lewis,
2012).
Netherlands
The Netherlands, like the UK, relies on statutory regulation to prevent workplace injuries
and illness, but its organization has shifted from state-directed coordination towards softer
forms of sectoral-level coordination between the social partners, and there is increasing co-
ordination with the corporatist social insurance system, which had long been decoupled
from preventative regulation. Initially founded on the 1895 Safety at Work Act, the regula-
tory regime was fleshed out over the next century through a complex mixture of detailed
statutory decrees, regulations and guidance. Though formally issued by the Ministry for
Social Affairs and Employment, detailed rules—in keeping with Dutch concerns to reinforce
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social consensus (Kickert, 2003)—have entailed extensive formal and informal consultation
through powerful tri-partite corporatist institutions, such as the Working Environment
Council and the Social and Economic Council. To further strengthen corporatist coordin-
ation, the 1980 Working Environment Act (WEA) sought to emulate the UK’s self-
regulatory approach by emphasizing principles rather than detailed rules; an approach
which became established in 2007 when the detailed regulations started to be replaced by
non-statutory ‘Labour Catalogues’. Reflecting CME organizational logics, Labour
Catalogues are elaborated at a sectoral level by employer and employee associations and
give sector-specific advice on meeting general regulatory obligations (Labour Foundation,
2007).
Implementation and enforcement, while formally rule-bound, are also relatively well
coordinated. The 1980 Work Environment Act significantly strengthened worker partici-
pation in firm-level safety issues, principally through works councils shaping shop-floor
practices (Popma et al., 2002). That approach has been complemented by the Labour
Inspectorate’s (SWZ) diagnostically Dutch approach to enforcement, which Van Waarden
(2009) terms ‘informal consensualism’. The inspectorate, which was established in 1919 as
Netherlands’ first dedicated national inspectorate and is an arm of the Ministry of Social
Affairs and Employment, has traditionally favoured pragmatic and non-legal negotiated so-
lutions, though Wilthagen reports that in practice negotiation has largely been with ‘firm’s
management and, less importantly, workers’ (Popma et al., 2002, p. 191). That negotiated
approach has been reinforced by legal duties on inspectors to persuade rather than punish
and on employers and employees to find ‘reasonable’ solutions.
Like Britain, the Dutch social insurance system, which combines both Bismarckian and
Beveridgean elements (Hemerijck,2011), has historically had no role in preventing work-
place accidents and illnesses. To make ex-post compensation costs predictable for employers
and workers alike, the 1901 Work Accidents Act prohibited civil litigation in favour of a dis-
ability benefits system funded through non-statutory employer contributions to a set of mu-
tual insurance associations—the Bedrijfsverenigingen—jointly controlled by employer
associations and trade unions. Over the C20th the Bedrijf’s expanded to provide disability
benefits for all sectors. Unlike Germany and France, however, premiums related to employee
numbers and salaries rather than workplace risks, which provided no mechanism for con-
taining costs to the system. That started to change in the 1980s when, faced with an eco-
nomic downturn, employers opportunistically took advantage of sickness funds to avoid
compulsory redundancies. In response, the state lifted the ban on civil litigation, incorpo-
rated the funds into the Social Security Agency (UWV), introduced risk-based premiums and
required employers to fund the first two years of benefits. New links between prevention
and compensation were also recently created by merging the Labour and Social Security
Inspectorates and the UWV is now consulted over the Labour Catalogues. The medical costs
of work-related injuries, however, are entirely decoupled from OHS regulation, since they
are met by mandatory individual health insurance.
4.2 The stringency of OHS regulatory protections
We now go on to describe whether and how the stringency of OHS regulation varies across
our four countries in order to test the extent to which any variation fits with VoC predic-
tions about institutional complementarities. We assess relative stringency not as arithmetical
deviations from the EU Directive’s absolute goal to ‘ensure’ the health and safety of workers,
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but by qualitatively investigating the explicitness, rationalizations and logics by which safety
is traded-off against the cost of prevention.
Germany
Germany’s transposition of the EU Framework Directive in the 1996 Occupational
Protection Act appeared to offer workers high levels of occupational safety by demanding,
without qualification, ‘that danger to life and health is avoided wherever possible and the re-
maining hazards are reduced to a minimum’. While this may seem to confirm CME-type pre-
vention expectations, in fact, employers’ responsibilities under the prior statutory regime,
dating back to the 1891 Industrial Code, had been limited to safeguarding workers against
dangers ‘insofar as permitted by the nature of the business’. The statutory aim of avoiding
danger ‘wherever possible’ is, in practice, more of an aspiration than an absolute legal re-
quirement. Indeed, for most of the C20th the headline goal of the German OHS regime was
not judiciable by the courts, which have never expected employers to do everything possible
irrespective of cost (Wank, 1992). The statutory imperative to avoid ‘danger’ has instead
served to provide a necessary legal basis for state interference with rights to economic activ-
ity and uphold the German constitutional provision that ‘Every person shall have the right
to life and physical integrity’ (Article 2(2)).
Such constitutional considerations make it difficult for the state to formally adjudicate
the risk-cost-benefit trade-offs inevitably involved in regulating OHS. As a Länder inspector
explained to Haunert (2012, p. 31), ‘the question which arises under a cost-benefit perspec-
tive would be “who is more entitled to this constitutional protection?”’ In place of conse-
quentialist questions about how safe is safe enough, the German regime focuses instead on
establishing procedural norms such as ‘generally recognized technical rules’ and best avail-
able technology, ‘. . .precisely to avoid discussion of costs and benefits,’ as a Federal
Ministry of Labour representative explained to us. Thus, employers’ preventative duties
under the Accident Insurance Law were oriented towards following the rules of the BGs
without explicitly considering the outcomes that resulted from doing so (Schaapman, 2002).
Though cost-benefit considerations may not be explicit, they still informally shape rule-
making by corporatist statutory committees and BGs (Paul and Huber, 2015). Hennock
(2007, p. 99) has argued that from the outset, BGs were expected to internalise costs so that
any ‘safety measures whose costs could not be justified by clearly foreseeable savings in com-
pensation payments were ruled out’. Likewise, a member of an expert committee of the
Federal Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (BAuA) suggested that ‘socio-economic
analyses always play a role’ in Federal rules too. He explained, for example, that ‘the [scien-
tific] MAK Commission sets a limit for substance X, but then the [corporatist] Committee
on Hazardous Substances says, “we believe you, but we can only achieve ten-times that limit
without bankrupting companies”.’ ‘It’s always a negotiation’ as another employer represen-
tative put it. One illustration is the exposure standard for carcinogenic diesel engine emis-
sions for underground mining, which has historically been three times less stringent than
both the limit for above-ground workplaces (Dahmann and Bauer, 1997) and the limit for
mines the UK’s HSE considers practically ‘achievable’ (Dabill, 2005, p. 4).
Trade-offs between safety and cost are also accommodated through discretion in imple-
mentation and enforcement. Firm safety committees play an important role in negotiating
how rules are implemented to fit the circumstances of each workplace. One safety engineer
argued that ‘we look for reasonable solutions that both sides [employers and employees] can
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live with; . . . one naturally looks at cost-benefit considerations’. Such negotiations are par-
ticularly facilitated when BG rules are framed in flexible terms such as delegating judgements
about best available technology to guild-style ‘masters’. At the same time, rule enforcement
follows the Administrative Procedures Act which requires sanctions to “be proportional
with costs and benefits” of non-compliance as one Länder Inspector explained. Most signifi-
cantly, perhaps, compromises between cost and safety are promoted through the very logic
of insurance. Premiums are fine-tuned to past safety performance to incentivize improve-
ments, though that logic balances the ex ante costs of accident prevention against the ex
post costs of accidents rather than accident prevention per se (Matchan, 1985).
France
Like Germany, France transposed the EU Framework Directive without qualification,
requiring employers to take all ‘necessary measures to ensure the safety . . . of workers’
(Article L.4121-1). That was consistent with long-standing obligations under the 1893
Industrial Establishments Act for employers to provide ‘clean and safe working conditions’
for their workers. These duties were fleshed out over the C20th in the rules of the Labour
Code, which as Chaumette (1992, p. 35) has noted cannot be formally qualified by consid-
eration of ‘cost, utility, technical difficulty or efficiency of safety measures’. As a Ministry
of Labour representative explained, ‘the vision of a cost-benefit analysis is not accepted
in France’; because it clashes with the constitutional duty of the state to ensure to every
citizen ‘protection of health, material security, rest and leisure’ (Preamble, 1946
Constitution, §11 ).
As in Germany, however, that unqualified regulatory goal of safety has served more as
an aspiration than literal principle of prevention; indeed it was not judicable in France for
most of the C20th. Instead, safety was effectively defined in terms of compliance with the de-
tailed rules fleshed out in the Labour Code. While those rules do not formally embody cost-
benefit trade-offs, in practice, corporatist discussions at COCT entail considerations of how
to balance the costs of protection against marginal increases in safety. As a civil servant
from the Ministry of Labour explained, ‘Cost and benefits are considered amongst other
things. . .but it doesn’t occur within a formal and predefined framework.’ For example, the
civil servant observed that while the safest way to make a small 10-minute repair to a water
tower would ‘take 15 weeks to first build a scaffold . . . we will accept ropes and climbers, if
there is no alternative . . .’.
Trade-offs between safety and cost are also tolerated by the enforcement system.
DIRECCTE inspectors told us they spend as much, if not more, time enforcing general la-
bour law (cf. HSE, 1996, p. 53), but when they do focus on OHS, they are forced to exercise
discretion in reconciling the Labour Code’s inflexible and unqualifiable rules with workplace
realities. As a Directte inspector explained, ‘Typically we’ll say: “Your company has ten ser-
ious problems, but three are really wrong that you must fix within two months, then the
others . . .” well, obviously there is some acceptability in practice.’ Enforcement gaps are ex-
plicitly acknowledged by the DIRECCTE; as one recent official report poetically stated, ‘The
Law in practice is, by nature, not fully overlapping with the Law . . . Full compliance with
the law is aspirational’ (DIRECCTE, 2012, pp. 32/33).
As social insurers the Caisses do not primarily focus on law enforcement but instead on
containing costs through prevention rules and insurance premiums. While we were told that
explicit discussion of socio-economic considerations in designing prevention measures is
1006 H. Rothstein et al.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/article/17/4/993/4107902 by H
ochschulbibliothek, Fachhochschule Bielefeld user on 29 O
ctober 2020
resisted by employee representatives, they are nevertheless taken into account in implement-
ing those measures. As a representative of a CARSAT explained, ‘With our technical expert-
ise, we are still pragmatic. We’re not going to ask a company with two employees to
implement a measure that costs e1m.’ As in Germany, insurance premiums reflect past safety
performance–known as the ‘cost of risk’—to incentivize safety improvements, but as Rivest
(2002, p. 90) has argued, that has shaped firm compliance behaviours in ways that follow a
‘logic of compensation’ rather than simple safety improvement.
UK
In contrast to Germany and France, the UK’s qualified implementation of the EU
Framework Directive reflected the explicitly consequentialist philosophy of optimising risk-
cost-benefit trade-offs introduced by the 1974 HSWA. Both employers and employees had
complained to the landmark Robens Inquiry into the prior rules-based regime, that ‘the
sheer mass of this law, far from advancing the cause of safety and health’ led to inflexible
safety ‘standards’ and inconsistent levels of protection across sectors (Robens, 1972,
para.28, p. 458). Sometimes the rules were unnecessarily burdensome, such as multiple
guards for powered saws even if they were museum exhibits (Demeritt et al., 2015). At other
times, the rules were too lax. As one inspector explained, ‘the old regulations only required
guard rails for platforms higher than 2m. If it was 1.95cm you didn’t have to have guard-
rails, but you’d probably still get injured if you fell’. Some sectors, such as retail, were not
regulated for decades.
The HSWA’s ‘principles-based’ approach drew on case-law concerning a collapsed mine
roadway that killed a miner. In that case, the Court of Appeal first introduced the term
‘risk’, ruling that ‘reasonably practicable’ is a narrower term than “physically possible”’ and
that it would have been unreasonable to expect the National Coal Board to shore up all
roadways, since the cost, time and effort required to reduce risk should not be in ‘gross dis-
proportion’ to the margin of safety gained [Edwards v. National Coal Board (NCB), [1949]
1 All ER 743]. The HSWA generalized that risk-cost-benefit approach to all workplaces by
making it a criminal offence to expose workers to an unreasonable level of risk from any
hazard, whether or not anyone was actually harmed. The HSE made the risk-based calculus
underlying that principle more explicit when it elaborated its ‘Tolerability of Risk’ frame-
work in the late 1980s to explain to stakeholders how it made trade-offs between risk, cost,
and benefit in its enforcement decisions (HSE, 1998).
The explicit focus on risk is largely the result of the HSWA reframing regulation from a
procedural focus on rule-based compliance to a principles-based focus on anticipated out-
comes. Like the common law duty of care, which is limited to circumstances where harm is
‘reasonably foreseeable’ (Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 AC 562), the SFAIRP principle re-
stricts employers’ criminal liability to harms that were foreseeable, while also requiring them
to take reasonable precautions against risk even if no harm actually occurs. Indeed, without
that qualification, employers would face unlimited liability given that it will always be ‘phys-
ically possible’ to do more than what is reasonably practicable. As one senior retired HSE of-
ficial commented, ‘we could retrofit the London Underground with straight platforms . . .,
but the costs would be horrendous’. This flexibility ensures that safety standards fit with
wider institutional contexts and constraints.
Without prescriptive rules to define what is ‘reasonably practicable’ in every case, the UK
relies on regulatory enforcement by a technically expert inspectorate that can judge the
Varieties of risk regulation in Europe 1007
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ser/article/17/4/993/4107902 by H
ochschulbibliothek, Fachhochschule Bielefeld user on 29 O
ctober 2020
adequacy of employers’ risk assessments of reasonable practicability. Those judgements
could mean going beyond old rules. As one inspector explained, ‘prior to the HSWA, we
couldn’t require mechanically fed factory saws to be totally contained, even if the safety gain
far outweighed the cost’. Inspector discretion, however, is constrained by case law and best-
practice guidance published by the HSE and other bodies such as the British Standards
Institute. In turn, the criminal law framework of OHS regulation provides strong incentives
for employers to heed inspector judgment. Black (2002) has characterized this process as a
‘regulatory conversation’ in which employers and inspectors identify practices that the
courts are likely to regard as constituting legal compliance.
Netherlands
The Netherlands has, over time, increasingly qualified the goal of safety. Whereas the 1934
Safety Act demanded ‘safe and sound’ working conditions and a standard of protection that
is the ‘highest possible one in the light of technical developments’, the 1980 Working
Environment Act (WEA) sought to emulate the spirit of the UK’s HSWA by qualifying the
general duty of employers to ‘aim for maximum possible safety’ with the proviso ‘as far as
can reasonably be required’. That qualified promise of safety persists to this day, notwith-
standing the transposition of the EU framework Directive. Likewise, the Civil Code only re-
quires employers to ‘protect workers against danger to life. . .as can reasonably be expected
given the nature of the work’ (Article 1638x).
As in Germany and France, however, these headline goals are less important than the
specific rules that give them practical meaning. Rule-making is done in consultation with
powerful tri-partite corporatist institutions, and as such has always reflected bargaining over
trade-offs between safety, profits, wages and jobs (e.g. see Walters et al., 2003, p. 73). This
prescriptive approach persisted alongside the qualified goal of WEA for several decades until
the introduction of the non-statutory Labour Catalogues in 2007. Those sectoral-level
Catalogues, according to the Labour Foundation (2007, pp. 9–10) were a ‘joint product’ of
the ‘social partners’ aimed at giving them ‘more freedom to determine for themselves which
solution or general approach would be possible and desirable’.
The shift in the Netherlands then has not been about weakening worker protections so
much as giving firms more flexibility in how to protect workers. This shift has been mirrored
in the ongoing tension between the formal rules-based regulatory approach towards OHS
and the broad tradition of consensual regulatory enforcement. The accommodative ap-
proach of the inspectorate towards regulatory enforcement was given greater legal footing
under the 1980 WEA by qualifying all duties in terms of ‘as far as can reasonably be
required’, which as De Gier notes (1992, p. 148) formally enables compliance to be depend-
ent ‘on circumstances such as the cost of investment or current state of knowledge’.
According to Rimington et al. (2003), the overall emphasis on dialogue between inspectors
and employers to determine how to comply has led to a strong resemblance between the UK
and Dutch regimes.
However, recent efforts to make regulatory requirements more flexible and proportion-
ate are still constrained by the rules, codes and guidance that courts use to assess legal com-
pliance. For example, stung by public criticism of lax enforcement in the early 1990s, the
Inspectorate’s approach became more legalistic and less flexible (Popma et al., 2002). On
those rare occasions when cases go to trial after accidents, courts have interpreted the con-
cept of reasonableness in terms of technical possibility, or as one labour lawyer put it to us,
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as ‘geared towards the elimination of risks’, rather than in terms of how safe is safe enough
considering costs. Frustration with that legalistic approach has led some industry representa-
tives and politicians to advocate a more quantitative risk-based definition of ‘reasonable’,
but that has proved elusive in the context of significant sectoral variation over what consti-
tutes acceptable risk (Rimington et al., 2003).
5. Discussion
The findings set out in Section 4.1 above and summarized in Table 1 below show how the
organization of OHS regulatory regimes varies across our purposeful sample of four coun-
tries. These patterns are broadly consistent with the predictions we derived from VoC theory
about their distinctive modes of coordinating the wider political economy.
However, the findings presented in Section 4.2 and summarized in Table 2 below did not
suggest any similar systematic differences in the stringency of OHS regulatory protections
across our countries, as VoC theory would predict. All our countries make trade-offs on
safety—albeit in different ways—and, as noted in the Introduction, while fatality rates in the
UK are among the lowest in the EU, differences between our four countries are small in ab-
solute terms.
We seek to explain these divergent findings on organization and stringency in the discus-
sion below.
There are good reasons to argue that the organization of the OHS regulatory regimes
are, at the very least, ‘coherent’ with the dominant modes of coordination between firms
and other actors in each country. That coherence can be partly explained in terms of iso-
morphic pressures without making any stronger claims about complementarity. Although
the OHS regimes in our four countries emerged contemporaneously and borrowed from one
another in confronting common problems (Hennock, 2007), they are now well into their se-
cond century of existence, and it would be surprising indeed if isomorphic pressures had not
pushed each country’s regime down nationally distinctive evolutionary pathways.
Thus in Germany, Bismarck’s opposition to state OHS regulation in favour of coordin-
ation through guild-style associations is coherent with the often noted German preference
for self-regulatory solutions that draw on the governance capacities of business and other
societal actors (Paul and Huber, 2015); a preference reinforced by the strict constraints on
state interference with rights to economic activity imposed by the post-war Constitution.
While France also has a dual OHS system, the greater emphasis on state action is coherent
with the typically central role of the French state in regulation, with its complex and inflex-
ible administrative and legal culture (Dupuy and Thoenig, 1983) creating uniquely French
coordination problems requiring worker and employer preferences to be informally nego-
tiated through enforcement practices and the social insurance system. By contrast, the
UK’s regulatory approach to OHS involves arms-length state regulation typical of an
LME, albeit with a high-level—if steadily weakening—corporatist mechanism to coordin-
ate the regulatory preferences of firms and employees. Finally, the Dutch approach to
OHS regulation is coherent with the Dutch tradition of ‘polder politics’ based on extensive
consultation and compromise among the social partners and interests (Hendriks and
Toonen, 2001); reflected in the shift from a state-led corporatist model onto sectoral asso-
ciations coupled with an enforcement culture of ‘informal consensualism’ (Van Waarden,
2009).
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The coherence of the four regimes with their respective country settings reflects, as
Thatcher (2007) found with his study of network regulation, remarkable persistence of na-
tional regulatory styles. Such stable equilibria would be hard to imagine if regulatory re-
gimes were swapped between countries. For example, just as a British style arms-length
Table 1. The organization of regulatory regimes for OHS in Germany, France, the UK and
Netherlands
VoC hypotheses Empirical findings
Standard-setting Compliance
Germany
CME regulation organized
through dense sectoral networks
of employers and employees in
strong corporatist institutions
underpinned by legal frameworks
that sustain a relatively equal
balance of power between the
social partners
Corporatist representation
on statutory standard-setting
committees, with detailed
compliance rules devised
and issued by self-regulating
corporatist social insurance
BGs
Compliance shaped by worker
representation on firm-level
works councils, policed both by
Länder Labour Inspectorates and
by technical inspectorates from
corporatist BGs, and incentivized
by fine-tuned insurance premiums
France
MME regulation sees state
playing more central role than in
CMEs in coordinating business
and labour interests to organize
rule-making and implementation
Advised by corporatist COCT,
state issues detailed rules through
statutory Labour Code, with
parallel guidance also provided
by sectorally organized
corporatist social insurance
Caisses
Compliance weakly shaped by
worker participation in firm-level
safety committees, policed by
state labour inspectors, supported
by inspectors from sectorally
organized corporatist social
insurance Caisses, and
incentivized by fine-tuned
insurance premiums
UK
LME regulation organized
through independent agencies
operating at arms-length from
sectoral interests in permissive
legal frameworks oriented
towards correcting broad market
failures
Enforced self-regulation of
universal principle of SFAIRP
overseen by powerful
independent regulator (HSE),
albeit with weakened tri-partite
oversight
Compliance with SFAIRP
enforced by expert state
inspectors from HSE and local
authorities within criminal law
framework. Little influenced by
insurers or worker participation
on residual firm-level safety
committees
Netherlands
CME/LME regulation sees
oscillation between state directed
and softer forms of decentralized
corporatism to coordinate
business and labour interests
in rule-making and
implementation
Extensive tri-partite participation
in rule-making with detailed
statutory regulations recently
replaced by non-statutory
Labour Catalogues giving
sectorally specific advice on
meeting general regulatory
obligations
Compliance shaped by worker
participation at firm-level,
policed by state Labour
Inspectorate with strong culture
of consensualism and historically
no role for social insurers
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national regulator with only a high-level corporatist character would not be ‘compatible’ (in
Boyer’s (2005) sense) with a German federal system that delegates power to strong sectoral
corporatist associations, so Germany’s devolved regulatory model of social partner con-
trolled BGs would struggle to coexist alongside Britain’s centralised welfare state.
However, our qualitative historical research suggests that coherence between the organ-
ization of OHS regulation and mode of coordination is not just the result of mere isomorph-
ism shaping each country’s OHS regime, but is fashioned by a stronger dynamic of
complementarity. That complementarity does not so much arise from a direct mutually
enhancing relationship between the two, but rather it arises because they are both tightly
Table 2. The stringency of regulatory protections for OHS in Germany, France, the UK and
Netherlands
VoC hypotheses Empirical findings
Standard-setting Compliance
Germany
CME regulation sees strong ex
ante safety measures agreed by
social partners to complement
employer investments in training
and labour market inflexibilities
preventing exit to safer
workplaces
Headline statutory goal of
avoiding danger, but qualified in
practice through corporatist
social insurance rule-making,
which embodies implicit cost-
benefit trade-offs
Trade-offs and cost
considerations accommodated
through flexible interpretation of
‘state-of-the-art’ standards by
state and insurance inspectorates
France
MME regulation sees
intermediate and potentially
unstable level of protection
depending on tug-of-war between
powerful state intervention and
institutionalized political and
constitutional checks by business
and labour
Headline statutory goal of
ensuring safety, but qualified in
practice through detailed Labour
Code and insurance rules
involving implicit cost-benefit
trade-offs negotiated by
corporatist actors
Trade-offs and cost
considerations accommodated
through gaps in state
enforcement and insurer
tolerance of practicable rather
than complete prevention
UK
LME regulation sees weak OHS
protections as employers have
little interest in retaining workers,
who have flexibility to negotiate
higher wages to reflect workplace
risks or seek safer employment
elsewhere
Headline statutory goal of safety
formally qualified ‘so far as
reasonably practicable’, which
can also require employers to
exceed conventional standards
where it is practical to do more
Acceptability of trade-offs judged
by expert inspectors deploying an
‘enforcement pyramid’ of
sanctions in proportion to risk
and criminal prosecution
deterring gross violations
Netherlands
CME/LME regulation sees
broadly strong levels of
protection agreed by social
partners but potentially
weakening in face of greater
labour market flexibility
Headline statutory safety goals
formally qualified ‘as far as can
reasonably be required’, with
trade-offs accommodated
through detailed corporatist-
designed rules
Trade-offs and cost
considerations accommodated
through culture of ‘informal
consensualism’ and formal
requirement for corporatist
consensus
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coupled to, and complementary with national welfare systems. Thus while welfare systems
have long been argued to complement national production regimes (e.g. Estevez-Abe et al.,
2001), our research has uncovered a hitherto unremarked mutually reinforcing relationship
between those systems for securing the welfare of workers ex post and the organization of
ex ante OHS regulation. That three-way complementarity is perhaps most readily seen in
the German and British cases.
In the German Bismarckian social insurance context, the creation of mutual insurance
funds in the form of the BGs enhanced wider corporatist collaborations between business
and labour, but required some form of regulation to ensure the financial sustainability of the
funds in the face of unlimited no fault liability. That problem was solved by not just handing
the BGs control over premiums but also by giving them powers to prevent accidents through
setting regulatory standards, giving advice and ‘enforcing’ their own sectorally specific rules
in parallel with legal enforcement by state inspectorates.
By contrast, the UK’s Beveridgean approach to welfare ensures a safety net for workers
independent of their contract of employment to facilitate worker mobility, but this then
poses a different cost-control problem to that of Germany. Disconnected from employers,
the taxpayer-funded NHS and universal benefits regime have neither the knowledge, cap-
acity nor incentive to impose preventative controls on employers because occupational
health and safety accounts for just a small proportion of their costs. The state’s principal
mechanism for containing welfare costs comes from crackdowns on disability benefits and
constant handwringing over the NHS picking up the costs of a wide set of social ills. That
leaves the statutory regulatory regime operating only according to a logic of prevention ra-
ther than insurance, with a principles-based approach ensuring its reach across all work-
places, which enjoy the flexibility diagnostic of an LME to determine precisely how to meet
their SFAIRP duties.
In France, the relationship between regulation and the welfare state is more complex and
less complementary. The French Caisses have faced the same cost-control problems of the
BGs, but they have been unable to emulate the BGs because the French Republican tradition
puts the duty to regulate firmly on the State. Instead, the Caisses have sought to control com-
pensation costs by developing and ‘enforcing’ their own detailed ‘accident prevention’ rules,
which operate in parallel to, but are poorly coordinated with, the state Labour Code.
In the Netherlands, the Bedrijf’s faced similar cost-control problems as their Bismarckian
counterparts in Germany and France, but addressed these challenges differently. Historically
these compensation funds were uninvolved in preventative regulation because of their
underlying philosophy that, according to Popma et al. (2002, p. 181) ‘originated largely
from Christian forms of charity and mutual and professional arrangements, [making] the
system . . . immune to any instrumentalist policies’. In the face of escalating costs of sick-
ness and disability benefits, however, the institutional equilibrium was disturbed and the
reformed social security regime has been forced to play more of an active role in preven-
tion and regulation.
In contrast to that three-way complementarity between the organization of OHS regula-
tion, welfare systems and modes of coordination in different VoCs, however, our research
does not suggest any systematic differences in the stringency of OHS regulatory protections
across our countries. Although striking differences in headline regulatory goals give the
superficial impression of unqualified protection in Germany and France with the
Netherlands drifting towards the qualified approach of the UK, as might be predicted by
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VoC, our research shows that in practice all four countries tolerate trade-offs on the costs of
ensuring workplace safety. That finding is consistent with fatality data which shows that the
rates are within a few multiples of each other across all four countries, and that if anything,
Germany, and particularly France, which do not qualify their legal requirements for safety,
perform worse than the UK and the Netherlands which do permit such qualifications.
While trade-offs are common to all our four countries, however, there are striking insti-
tutional differences in where, how and on what basis those trade-offs are made. Thus in the
absence of qualified headline goals of safety in the rules-based regimes of Germany and
France, trade-offs are accommodated in the corporatist-designed rules, insurance premiums
and enforcement practices of state regulators and insurance associations. By contrast in the
principles-based regime of the UK, trade-offs are explicitly made on the regulatory goal of
safety, subject to criminal law sanctions. In the Dutch rules-based regime, regulatory goals
are formally qualified with trade-offs accommodated in the corporatist-designed rules and
enforcement practices of state regulators. We can go a long way to explain those institu-
tional geographies by considering how trade-offs are filtered through three institutional vari-
ables in each country; i.e. the legal systems, state traditions and character of coupling
between regulation and welfare regimes.
A first institutional variable shaping the explicitness of trade-offs concerns the contrast-
ing legal systems of the UK and the other three countries, which make it difficult to compare
the stringency of regulatory protections by reference solely to headline law. The British com-
mon law tradition places great weight on consistent judicial interpretation of the law, which
is ensured by constraining judges to interpret statutes according to their literal meaning and
by demanding consistency with the precedential decisions (the ‘common law’) of higher
courts. As a consequence, the UK needed to qualify the Directive’s goal of ensuring safety
because legal literalism would otherwise have criminalized virtually every employer (HSE,
1989, p. 17). While the courts have some scope to avoid such absurd results, more qualified
interpretations of the law would have been controversial if Parliament had removed the pre-
existing SFAIRP qualification when transposing the Directive.
By contrast, statutes in civil law systems tend to take the form of general legal frame-
works that set aspirational aims rather than unambiguous requirements (e.g. Huber, 2009;
Rose-Ackerman and Perroud, 2013). The reason is that under separation of powers doc-
trines granting the legislature primacy over the courts, the law is expected to be sufficiently
complete and clear so as not to demand interpretation by judges (Merryman, 1985, p. 29).
Since that is rarely possible in practice, judges tend to interpret the spirit of the law, with
legal consistency traditionally coming from the further elaboration of extensive codes and
rules that give meaning to general statutes. Contrasts between common and civil law can be
overstated, but one difference is that the French and German goal of safety has been defined
more in terms of following specified rules rather than literally preventing harm, as evidenced
by the historically non-judicable nature of their headline goals. By the same token, the
Dutch qualified goal of safety is constrained by a rule-based tradition that makes it hard to
do less or even do more (cf. Ale, 2005).
One important consequence of how these two legal traditions have addressed OHS is
that they have favoured different balances between precision and flexibility in rule design.
As Diver (1983) has observed, precise rules help ensure legal consistency but the problem of
‘requisite variety’ means that as rules become narrower so their number has to increase to
match the variety of circumstances that they must meet. Flexible rules, by contrast, can cope
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with a wide variety of unanticipated circumstances, but they must be accompanied by com-
monly held interpretative principles to ensure consistent application.
Understood in those terms, the introduction of the UK’s qualified goal-based regime was
not an attempt to reduce levels of regulatory protection as it might look from a VoC per-
spective, but a solution to the insufficient requisite variety of the prior prescriptive regime,
which had failed to cover all sectors let alone workplace situations. By contrast, continental
rule-based regimes have traditionally addressed the problem of requisite variety in their pre-
scriptive regimes through, inter alia: creating more rules to meet more circumstances; creat-
ing rules that formally permit discretion; informal discretionary enforcement of the law; and
firm-level implementation practices.
A second institutional variable shaping how regulatory decisions and trade-offs are
rationalized concerns our countries’ contrasting state traditions. The UK’s outcome-oriented
approach to OHS regulation demanded explicit acceptance of risk-cost-benefit rationa-
lizations of the limits of employee protection and employer liability. Such rationalizations
are familiar in the UK, which is unconstrained by any written constitution according individ-
ual rights that could conflict with utilitarian calculations of how to achieve optimal social
welfare.
By contrast, while the socio-economic implications of OHS regulation are recognized in
Germany and France, explicit cost-benefit rationalizations of regulatory decisions are re-
sisted, not least because of conflicts with their more rights-based constitutional settings.
Instead, rationalizations of decision-making in those countries focus more on procedural ra-
ther than outcome legitimacy. Thus in Germany, rules are rationalized as the outcome of ne-
gotiation amongst the social partners. Indeed, this approach is consistent with the German
constitutional court’s view that participation is the key instrument for individuals to defend
their positive constitutional rights to protection (Grimm, 2005). The French republican trad-
ition, by contrast, formally puts the state at the centre above special interests, so the Labour
Code derives legitimacy from the state’s leading procedural role subject to a constitutional
emphasis on equality and individual rights.
The Netherlands sits somewhere between the UK and the other two countries. Utilitarian
rationalizations are familiar in the Netherlands, not least evidenced by the OHS regime’s
qualified goal of safety. However, the character of the Dutch polity favours procedural solu-
tions that are founded on agreement amongst the social partners. Thus while safety is re-
garded ‘as a core government responsibility’ as the 2010 Coalition Agreement (VVD-CDA,
2010, p. 51) stated, it is rather regarded as a means of preserving and reinforcing the social
fabric of Dutch society than as an end in itself.
A third and final institutional variable shaping the character of cost-safety trade-offs fol-
lows from our identification of the complementary relationship between the organization of
OHS regulation and welfare systems. In the UK and, largely the Netherlands, where regula-
tion is decoupled from social insurance, accident prevention is only concerned with trading-
off the ex ante costs of safety measures against gains in worker safety. Indeed, in the
Netherlands soaring disability rates made this arrangement unstable and forced a degree of
coupling between ex ante prevention and ex post compensation. In the dual systems of
France and Germany, however, where regulation is closely coupled to social insurance, the
ex ante costs of safety measures have to be traded off against not just against gains in worker
safety but also the ex post costs of compensation. Indeed, while Germany and France like to
portray the Anglo-Saxon practice of explicitly valuing life in regulation as a cultural
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anathema, those countries effectively put a price on life through the preventative activities of
their social insurance systems.
The different couplings between regulation and welfare regimes suggests a cleavage in
what is at stake in OHS regulation that does not map easily onto VoC predictions of varied
ex ante worker protection across our countries. That cleavage does, however, help explain
the conflict at the ECJ over the UK’s qualification of the Framework Directive’s goal of
ensuring safety. In the French and German context, ensuring safety is not just about avoid-
ing accidents but is also about compensating workers—or their survivors—for occupational
injuries and sickness. Indeed, it is perhaps significant that in French ‘safety’ translates as the
rather broader concept of ‘sécurité’, which encompasses aftercare and indemnification for
lost earning potential as well as ex ante prevention. In that context, the EC was not so much
complaining that the UK’s qualified approach to safety was insufficiently focussed on pre-
vention, but was rather anxious that it could undermine the founding principal of the con-
tinental no-fault liability approach to ensure ex post costs were always met. As the Advocate
General Mengozzi (2007) made clear in his opinion for the ECJ, this was not an issue for the
UK, because ex post costs are socialized through the welfare system and the NHS and fur-
ther complemented by tort.
Those three variables, therefore, help explain why, despite stark differences in headline
goals, the stringency of OHS regulatory protections does not significantly vary across our four
countries and, therefore, unlike the organization of the regimes, appears to be independent of
VoC. In that context, it is not entirely clear how much significance should be placed on the
UK’s consistently low-workplace fatality rates (see Figure 1), which seems counter-intuitive
from a VoC perspective. If we were to speculate, we could point to the UK’s singular regula-
tory focus on the prevention of accidents and ill-health compared to the broader focus of the
French and German regimes on protecting the fund as much as the worker. We might also
point to the UK’s distinctive goal-based regulatory philosophy, which, by focusing attention
on outcomes, overcame the problems of insufficient requisite variety that had plagued its prior
rule-based approach. By contrast, our other countries have struggled to make a rules-based
approach meet the needs of protecting workers in this complex regulatory domain; most not-
ably evident in the French attempts to implement the Labour Code. Indeed, it may not be a co-
incidence that Dutch fatality rates improved soon after the Dutch handed rule-making to
sectoral associations in 2007 to address the problem of requisite variety. However, given that
this paper has focused more on the principles of regulatory design rather than the outcome for
worker safety, it would be unwise to draw strong conclusions on the relative effectiveness of
each system without careful empirical study.
6. Conclusions
In conclusion, our in-depth analysis of four advanced European countries found that VoC
theory is a good predictor of the varied organization of their OHS regulatory regimes. We
argue that finding can be partly explained by unsurprising isomorphic pressures that result
in strong degrees of coherence between the organization of regulation and the dominant
modes of coordination between firms and other actors in each country. However, we go
further to argue that the varied organization of OHS regimes is not simply the result of iso-
morphism, but arises through much stronger and hitherto unremarked three-way institu-
tional complementarities with those countries’ welfare systems and modes of coordination.
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However, contrary to a commonly held view in the VoC literature that workers are bet-
ter protected in CMEs than LMEs, we found no such pattern for the stringency of OHS
regulatory protections across our countries, despite the impression given by their regimes’
strikingly varied headline goals. All the OHS regimes make trade-offs on safety, albeit vary-
ing in their explicitness, rationalizations and logics. Thus, where regulation is closely
coupled to social insurance, negotiation over the prevention of accidents is tempered by
concerns over financing compensation, treatment and rehabilitation. Where regulation and
welfare regimes are decoupled then bargaining is just about accident prevention. The expli-
citness of those bargains and the way that they are rationalized are likewise shaped by the
legal systems and state traditions within which they are immersed.
Further research is required to test the wider applicability of these findings. Extending
the number of case-study countries would help establish the generalizability of the findings
for OHS regulation. For example, the USA and Ireland would be good examples of LMEs as
they share a common law heritage but have different state traditions and couplings between
OHS regulation and welfare regimes. Extending the study to other policy domains would
help establish the relevance of our findings for regulation more widely, but care would obvi-
ously need to be taken when interpreting the relevance of cases where the regulated activity
may have little to do with relationships between firms and other actors.
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